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MONETARISM SIMULATED*
Abstract
Any model admitting inflation as an equilibrating variable will con-
tain a derivative of price with respect to time, hence be intrinsic-
ally dynamic, and will immediately have two additional equilibrating
variables, the nominal and the real rate of interest. Any model deny-
ing that monetary policy can peg the rate of unemployment for more
than very limited periods, must dismiss and go beyond such periods
and become a long-run model.
A long-run, dynamic, and two-interest-rates model is clearly in-
compatible with the short-run, static, one-interest-rate IS-LM frame-
work offered by Friedman (1970) as his theoretical framework.
The paper works its way backwards from Friedman's conclusions
to a model which will deliver them and shows that a neoclassical
growth model will require little modification to do so.
*Paper read at the ninth annual convention of the Eastern Economic
Association in Boston on March 10, 1983.

MONETARISM SIMULATED
Hans Brems
...The monetary authority controls nominal quantities...
It cannot use its control over nominal quantities to peg
a real quantity—the real rate of interest, the rate of
unemployment. .
.
Friedman (1968: 11)
1. Friedman's Problem
Friedman wished to include the rate of inflation among his equilib-
rating variables. To do so he unfroze Keynesian price. But merely making
the level of price a variable wouldn't do. It is one thing to tell
how high price would be. It is quite a different thing to tell how ra-
pidly price would be changing—which is what inflation is all about.
Any model admitting inflation will contain a derivative with respect
to time dP/dt, hence be intrinsically dynamic. Any model admitting in-
flation as an equilibrating variable will immediately have two addition-
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al ones, i.e., the nominal and the real rate of interest—as perhaps
Turgot (1769-1770) and certainly Fisher (i896) taught us. Consequently
a Friedman model must be a dynamic two-interest-rates model.
According to Friedman (1968: 5), monetary policy cannot peg the rate
of unemployment for more than very limited periods. Consequently
a oonetarist model must dismiss and go beyond such limited periods
and become a long-run model.
2. Friedman's Method
Such a long-run, dynamic, and two-interest-rates model is clearly
incompatible with the short-run, static, one-interest-rate IS-LM frame-
work offered by Friedman, himself (1970) as his "theoretical framework".
As Thygesen (1977) observed in his Nobel article, Friedman "is clearly
uncomfortable with it".
Crowding-out is a Friedman idea treated equally cavalierly. Crowd-
ing—out refers to the crowding-out of private investment by government
purchase of goods and services. To simulate it one would need a model
including an investment function and a tax rate, yet in his own writing
Friedman offered neither. Indeed, recent monetarist tradition [Brunner
-Meltzer (1976)] does not even distinguish between consumption and in-
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vestment demand
.
Such silence about behavior hypotheses was common in the days of
David Hume and survived in Friedman's reliance (1959, 1966) on single-equation
reduced-form econometrics. The idea of his "positive" economics seems
to be that if a reduced-form equation will fit the facts then never mind
which particular behavior hypotheses it might be derived from. To us,
however, such things matter, and we must work our way backwards from
Friedman's conclusions to a model which will deliver them. As it.
happens, a neoclassical growth model requires little modification
to do so. We shall now see how.
I. NOTATION
1. Variables
C = physical consumption
D = desired holding of money
G = physical government purchase of goods and services
2 i proportionate rate of growth of variable v
I 3 physical investment
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k = present gross worth of another physical unit of capital stock
< = physical marginal productivity of capital stock
L 5 labor employed
n 5 present net worth of another physical unit of capital stock
P = price of good3 and services
R. 5 tax revenue
r = before-tax nominal rate of interest
P = after-tax real rate of interest
S = physical capital stock
w = money wage rate
X = physical output
T = money national income
y = money disposable income
2. Parameters
a = multiplicative factor of production function
a,
3
= exponents of a production function
c = propensity to consume
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F = available labor force
g = proportionate rate of growth of parameter v
v
X 5 proportion employed of available labor force
M = supply of money
m = multiplicative factor of demand-for-money function
y 5 exponent of demand-for-money function
T = tax rate
The model will include derivatives with respect to time, hence is
dynamic. All parameters are stationary except a, F, and Ji whose growth
rates are stationary.
H. THE MODEL
Define the proportionate rate of growth of variable v as
dv 1
g 3 (1)
dt v
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Define investment as the derivative of capital stock with respect
to time:
dS
IS— (2)
dt
Monetarists have shown no interest in specifying a production
function but may not object, we hope, to a Cobb -Douglas form
,a„e
(3)
where < a < 1; 0<8<l;a+B=l; and a > 0.
Let profit maximization under pure competition equalize real wage
rate and physical marginal productivity of labor:
w 3X X
- . _ , _ (4)
P 3L L
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Hearrange (4) and write the neoclassical mark-up-pricing equation
wL
P (5)
cX
saying that neoclassical price P equals per-unit labor cost wL/X narked
up in the proportion l/o.
Define physical marginal productivity of capital stock as
32 X
K = 3 - (6)
3S S
Let entrepreneurs be purely competitive ones, then price P of out-
put is beyond their control. At tine t, then, after-tax marginal value
productivity of capital stock is (1 - T)<(t)P(t).
Let there be a market in which money may be placed or borrowed at
a stationary before-tax nominal rate of interest r. Let interest earnings be
taxed and interest expense be tax-deductible. Then money may be placed
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or borrowed at the after-tax rate (1 - T)r. Let that rate be applied
when discounting future cash flows. As seen from the present time t,
then, after-tax marginal value productivity of capital stock is
(1 - T)<(t)P(t)e~^ "" ' rtt . Define present gross worth of another
physical unit of capital stock as the present worth of all future after-
tax marginal value productivities over its entire useful life:
k(T ) 2 r
x
(1 - T)<(t)P(t)e-<1 " T> r <c " T) dt (7)
Let entrepreneurs expect physical marginal productivity of capital
stock to be growing at the stationary rate g :
<
g (t - T)
«c(t) - <(T)a
and price of output to be growing at the stationary rate g :
gp(t " T)
P(t) - P(r)e r
Insert these into (7), define
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P = (1 - T)r - (g
K
+ 3p) (8)
and write the integral (7) as
k(x) «/"(!- T)K(T)P(T)e~p(t " T) dt
Neither (1 - T) , k(t) , nor P(t) is a function of t, hence may be
taken outside the integral sign. Cur g , g_, and r vere all said to be
stationary, hence the coefficient p of t is stationary, too. Assume
p > 0. As a result find the integral to be
k - (1 - T) kP/p (9)
Find present net worth of another physical unit of capital stock
as its gross worth minus its price:
n = k - P - [(1 - T)</p - 1]P
Desired capital stock is the size of stock for which the present
net worth of another physical unit of capital stock equals zero, or
-10-
(1 - T)ic - p (10)
Finally take equations (6) and (10) together and find desired
capital stock
S - (1 - T)6X/p (11)
In accordance with the definition (2), differentiate desired capital
stock (11) with respect to time, and write desired investment
dS
I=-= (1 - T)B^X/p (12)
dt
A
If we think of (11) and (12) as being derived for an individual
entrepreneur, then everything except X on their right-hand sides is
common to all entrepreneurs. Factor out all common factors, sum over
all entrepreneurs, then X becomes national physical output, and (11)
and (12) become national desired capital stock and investment, respec-
tively.
For all their attention to crowding-out, monetarists have shown
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little interest in deriving investment functions like (12). But let
us take a closer look at (11) and (12) just the same. Both are in
inverse proportion to p. What is p? In the definition (8) of p
let it be correctly foreseen that g = —our steady-state growth and
inflation model will indeed have the solutions (26) and (32), and his-
torically the physical marginal productivity < has displayed no secular
trend, see ch. 7 of Brems (1983). In that case p collapses into the
after-tax real rate of interest.
Once priced according to (5) , physical output becomes national
income: Let capital stock be immortal, so we may ignore capital con-
sumption allowances and define national income as the money value of
physical output
T = PX (13)
Define money disposable income before capital gains as national
income irinus government net receipts:
y 5 Y - R (14)
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Let real wealth in the neoclassical model consist of real money
stock M/P and the physical capital stock S. Real capital gains on
money stock are -g M/P and on physical capital stock zero. Consequently
real disposable income after capital gains is (Y - R - g M)/P, and let
consumption be the fraction c of that:
C- c(Y - R- g^/P (15)
Let labor employed be the proportion X of available labor force:
L » XF (16)
where < X < 1. The difference 1 - X is the "natural" rate of unemploy-
ment below which, according to Friedman (1968: 8) excess demand for labor
will push the real wage rate up, and above which excess supply will push it
down. Friedman sees the employment fraction X, then, as a long-run Walras-
ian equilibrium determined by the intersection of supply and demand curves
invulnerable to monetary policy. Could they be vulnerable to
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policy other than monetary policy? They could well be. A minimum-wage
statute can cut off the demand curve at the point at which the real
minimum wage rate equals the physical marginal productivity of labor.
As a result the employment fraction X is down. Or an unemployment-
compensation statute can shift the supply curve to the left by raising
the rate of unemployment compensation or lengthen the maximum period
of entitlement. As a result, the hardship of unemployment is reduced,
the incentive to look for jobs is reduced, and again the employment
fraction X is down. Even a Walrasian long-run equilibrium thus amended
by modern institutional arrangements would still generate an employment
fraction X to be considered a parameter by monetary policy.
Let tax revenue be in proportion to money national income:
R - TY (17)
and let the government finance its deficit, if any, by issuing noninterest-
bearing claims upon itself called money. The government budget constraint
is then
-14-
dM
GP - R = — (18)
dt
2
Let the demand for money'" be a function of money national income
and of the after-tax nominal rata of interest:
D - mY[(l - T)r] u (19)
where u < and m > 0.
Goods-market equilibrium requires the supply of goods to equal the
demand for them:
X - C + I + G (20)
Money-market equilibrium requires the supply of money to equal the
demand for it:
M - D (21)
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III. STEADY-STATE EQUILIBRIL'M GROWTH SOLUTIONS
1. Growth- Rat a Solutions
By differentiating equations (1) through (21) with respect to time
the reader may convince himself that they are satisfied by the following
steady-state growth solutions
8
c
* h (22 >
*D hi <23 >
«G " *X (24 >
ij " % (25)
H " h <26)
h " gF (27)
8m
" 8Y (28)
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iE " % (29)
8
r
" (30)
«
p
« (3D
*S " H (32)
8
tf/P
- S./« (33)
^ - ga
/a + gp
(34)
«*-«,*
(36)
Our growth was steady-state growth, for no right-hand side of our
solutions (22) through (36) was a function of time.
2. Properties of Growth-Pate Solutions
Our growth- rate solutions neatly deliver Friednan's conclusions.
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First, no growth-rate solution for the nine real variables C, G,
I, K, L, p, S, w/P, and X has the rate of growth g^ of the money supply
in it, directly or indirectly.
Second, the growth-rate solutions for the five nominal variables
D, P, S., Y, and y have the rate of growth g^^^ of the money supply in them,
directly or indirectly. The growth-rate solution for the sixth nominal
variable, r, does not, but its level may.
Third, the rate of growth g„ of the money supply may be thought of
as a policy instrument used to control inflation: Take the growth
-rate solutions (23) and (35) together, insert (3^-), and find
gp - gjj - (ga
/c + gp) (37)
or, in English: Knowing the rate of technological progress g and
the rate of growth of the labor force g_ and knowing the elasticity
a of physical output with respect to labor, the monetary authoriti-
es may control the rate of inflation g„ by controlling the rate of
growth gv^ of the money supply.
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3. The Level of the After-Tax Real Rata of Interest
In steady-state growth theory it is usually easier to solve for
growth rates than for levels. Can. we solve for cur after-tax real
rate of interest p? Insert the goods-market equilibrium condition
(20) into the left-hand side of the investment function (12) and write
the after-tax real rate of interest as
(1 - nSgjjX
X - (C + G)
Insert the definition (13) of national income and the tax func-
tion (17) into the consumption function (15) and the government bud-
get constraint (18). Divide by P and write physical consumption C
and government purchase G. Divide both numerator and denominator by
(1 - T)X and use (13) to write PX as Y. Insert the definition (8)
and the equilibrium condition (21) into the demand-for-money function
(19) and insert the result for the ratio M/Y. Finally insert our
newly found equilibrium-growth-rate solutions (26), (18), (32), and
(35) and write the solution for the after-tax real rate of interest
-19-
P - Bgj/A, (38)
where
[(1 - c)^ + cg
x
]m(p + gjj - gx)
y
A = 1 - c
1 - T
Here g stands for our equilibrium-growth-rate solution (34) ex-A
pressing g^ in terms of nothing but the parameters a, g , and g . Thus
(38) is a solution for the level of the after-tax real rate of interest
p in terms of the policy instrument g^. It is not an explicit solution
and cannot be, for it has the sum p + g^ - g„ raised to the power y on
its right-hand side. Still, for realistic values of y—say within the
3
range
-*s < y < — (38) is easy to interpret . If gL, is up the numerator
of A is up, and since the numerator is preceded by a minus sign, A is
down and p up. In other words, comparing a more inflationary steady
-state equilibrium growth track having a higher gM = gv to a less in-
flationary track, we find the former to have the higher after- tax real
rate of interest.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
To a neoclassical steady-state growth model we have added money, taxes,
and a government budget constraint and derived an investment function. Thus
modified, the model delivered most of Friedman conclusions. His growth-rate
solutions were delivered impeccably: no growth-rate solution for a real va-
riable had the rate of growth of the money supply in it. The growth-rate
solutions for five nominal variables did have the rate of growth of the
money supply. But our level (38) of the after-tax real rate of interest
did not deliver Friedman's conclusion that "the monetary authority ...
cannot ... peg a real quantity—the real rate of interest." For realistic
values of p it was clear that p was up if gM was up.
Such an effect of monetary policy upon the level of the after-tax
real rate of interest may be in ill accordance with Friedman's words but
in excellent accordance with his views. Our economy is a closed one in
which money can come into existence in no other way than by financing a
government budget deficit. Vice versa, a government budget deficit can
be financed in no other way than by expanding the money supply. The eco-
nomy on the more inflationary steady-state growth track, having a higher
-21-
jy = &, then, is also the economy having the higher budget deficit and
hence the higher physical government purchase G. In Friedman's view
such a higher physical government purchase G will crowd out private phys-
ical investment I. But how could it without the very effect upon the
after-tax real rate of interest we found? According tc our investment
function (12), investment was a function of the after-tax real rate of
interest and will be down only if that rate is up.
-22-
FOOTNOTES
Drud Hansen (1979) used a neoclassical growth model to simulate
monetarism but—like Friedman himself—ignored taxation.
2
On the money-market side, monetarist tradition disaggregates
more than we are doing and distinguishes among money, credit, and
securities markets. On the goods-market side, monetarist tradition
disaggregates less than we are doing and does not even distinguish
between consumption and investment demand [Brunner-Meltzer (1976)].
A good recent survey of crowding-out is Svindland (1930).
3
For correspondence suggesting the form (38) I am grateful to
J. Drud Hansen.
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